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Abstract
The hard problem of consciousness arises in most incarnations of present day physical-
ism. Why should certain physical processes necessarily be accompanied by experience? One
possible response is that physicalism itself should be modified in order to accommodate experi-
ence: But, modified how? In the present work, we investigate whether an ontology derived from
quantum field theory can help resolve the hard problem. We begin with the assumption that
experience cannot exist without being accompanied by a subject of experience (SoE). While
people well versed in Indian philosophy will not find that statement problematic, it is still contro-
versial in the analytic tradition. Luckily for us, Strawson has elaborately defended the notion of a
thin subject—an SoE which exhibits a phenomenal unity with different types of content (sensa-
tions, thoughts etc.) occurring during its temporal existence. Next, following Stoljar, we invoke
our ignorance of the true physical as the reason for the explanatory gap between present day
physical processes (events, properties) and experience. We are therefore permitted to con-
ceive of thin subjects as related to the physical via a new, yet to be elaborated relation. While
this is difficult to conceive under most varieties of classical physics, we argue that this may not
be the case under certain quantum field theory ontologies. We suggest that the relation binding
an SoE to the physical is akin to the relation between a particle and (quantum) field. In quantum
field theory, a particle is conceived as a coherent excitation of a field. Under the right set of
circumstances, a particle coalesces out of a field and dissipates. We suggest that an SoE can
be conceived as akin to a particle—a SelfOn—which coalesces out of physical fields, persists
for a brief period of time and then dissipates in a manner similar to the phenomenology of a
thin subject. Experiences are physical properties of selfons with the constraint (specified by a
similarity metric) that selfons belonging to the same natural kind will have similar experiences.
While it is odd at first glance to conceive of subjects of experience as akin to particles, the
spatial and temporal unity exhibited by particles as opposed to fields and the expectation that
selfons are new kinds of particles, paves the way for cementing this notion. Next, we detail the
various no-go theorems in most versions of quantum field theory and discuss their impact on the
existence of selfons. Finally, we argue that the time is ripe for a rejuvenated Indian philosophy
to begin tackling the three-way relationship between SoEs (which may become equivalent to
jivas in certain Indian frameworks), phenomenal content and the physical world. With analytic
philosophy still struggling to come to terms with the complex worlds of quantum field theory and
with the relative inexperience of the western world in arguing the jiva-world relation, there is a
clear and present opportunity for Indian philosophy to make a worldcentric contribution to the
hard problem of experience.
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1 The hard problem of consciousness
In its simplest formulation, the hard problem of consciousness is stated as “Why is anything ac-
companied by experience?”. To elaborate using naturalistic language, why are some physical
processes and events associated with an interior—a qualitative space which is felt from the in-
side. The presence of experience forces us to acknowledge that nature has an interior, private
and qualitative space and that there is no obvious a priori reason for this to exist. In recent times
Chalmers [5] often gets the credit, and rightly so, for putting the hard problem in its starkest terms.
The hard problem of consciousness does not imply a Cartesian subject or soul as the rest of this
paper should make clear. Further, and this is even more relevant to an Indian audience, no a
priori transcendental idealist stance can dissolve the hard problem: the key issue is interiority pure
and simple and this needs to be explained. For a physicalist the problem is “why are physical
processes accompanied by experience?” and likewise for a transcendental idealist, the problem
is “why is Brahman accompanied by interiority?”, though the latter is not something that one hears
very often.
The physicalist response of the past few decades has mainly been emergence [9]. My col-
leagues for example, constantly seek to reassure themselves by asserting that under the right set
of conditions and at the appropriate level of complexity, consciousness pops out from brain activ-
ity. The conditions are rarely spelled out: “We don’t know enough about the brain” is the refrain
and the complexity measures (and necessary thresholds) never formulated. Two other defense
mechanisms stand out. If it is pointed out that brain mechanisms are actually supervenient on a
more basic level of physics, the charge is one of reductionism. If new relations are postulated
to bridge the explanatory gap between brain processes and experience, the charge is one of sui
generis interactionism. With these two moves, further philosophy is discouraged and tacit commit-
ments to naïve identity theories left unchallenged and in their place—with the complexity problem
of emergence left unaddressed. Henceforth, we use the term taboo physicalism for this approach
cluster since it encompasses emergentist and eliminativist approaches alike while seeking to cor-
ral the mind-body problem for its exclusive preserve. Emergence (and eliminativism [7]) should
be carefully separated from holism (as will become clear). The various emergentist approaches
usually get started by pointing out the existence of lively self-organizing phenomena which adhere
to the second law of thermodynamics in letter while violating its spirit. The mind can then be seen
as “popping out” from the brain at a suitable level of complexity. In sharp contrast, holism asserts
that compositionality is not mere combination and that mind could be a holistic property of matter.
Holism goes back to Aristotle in the west and seems to be popular in Indian circles but it is fair to
say that mind-body holism has not seen a full fledged defense in recent years. For these reasons,
we separate holistic physicalism from taboo physicalism introduced earlier.
Idealism has seen better days in western philosophy. With roots stretching back several hun-
dred years [30], one would have been led to expect a strong response from the idealist camp by
taking a cue from Bishop Berkeley and adding German and Indian idealism to the mix. And, ar-
guably there has not been a strong response from Eastern (and Indian) idealism either. As we
have argued above, the onus is on the transcendental idealist to explain why there “seems” to
be spatio-temporally bounded interiority (experience) in the universe or in lila. Further, and this
is again just based on anecdotal observation, recently it has become somewhat fashionable to
assert that the universe is a simulation and this grounds idealist intuition. First, without additional
underpinnings, the simulated reality hypothesis is still physicalist (with a quantum computer [21]
or equivalent generating the simulation). Second, the question of why such a simulation is accom-
panied by experience still needs explanation. In other words, the explanatory gap persists in this
setting as well despite the virtual reality twist.
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In recent years, a surprisingly strong response has came from panpsychism [29, 33, 30]—the
ancient doctrine that qualia extend all the way down in nature and savaged by the critique that
this meant that “rocks have feelings.” In hindsight, this robust response is not surprising. Since
complexity thresholds for the emergence of experience are hard (if not impossible) to come by, the
alternative that consciousness gradually fades as one goes down in scale was always viable. In
other words, interiors are complex and gradually become more and more simple as one goes to
smaller scales. Complexity per se does not lead to consciousness. Instead consciousness grad-
ually becomes more complex on an evolutionary time scale. Panpsychism faces the combination
problem [26]: how do proto-experiences combine to form the full fledged experiences of which we
are familiar. Or to put it in a different way: more complex experiences do not seem to be built up
from simpler experiences in the sameway that, say, polypeptide chains aremade up of atoms. This
is an active area in philosophical circles at present. Panpsychism has to explain why conscious-
ness is spatio-temporally localized and is a very rare occurrence in nature—unless our intuitions
in this matter are seriously misguided. It may turn out that a sophisticated panpsychism will even-
tually emerge which is neither pan nor “psychic” but ends up assigning proto-experientiality to a
small subset of nature. To summarize, while panpsychism is a genuine alternative to emergence,
it faces huge problems of its own. This response to emergence also begs the question: why can’t
we begin with a revamped physicalism which is not emergentist and is not a priori panpsychist?
Our efforts here belong in this camp.
Another sophisticated response is neutral monism [2] stated simply as “Mind and matter are
manifestations of something neutral.” Here, the challenge is the explication of neutral properties,
substances etc. and how they give rise to both mind and matter. Further, there’s an asymmetry
between mind and matter which is not addressed in neutral monism. There is far more matter than
mind in the universe. And, it’s not clear why we can’t begin with a physicalism which eschews
matter as a starting point while accommodating experience. It is exactly the lack of a deeper phys-
icalist theory which is the problem in most versions of neutral monism. Due to this, neutral monism
often slides into a dual-aspect theory [1] wherein the interior aspect of nature is pushed all the way
down with interior/exterior parallels established at various levels. Such a pan-interiority clearly
has echoes in panpsychism which is why neutral monism, dual aspect theory and panpsychism
are often discussed together. Clearly there are numerous differences between these myriad ap-
proaches. Since the present work’s focus is an expanded physicalism [31] that can accommodate
experience, we choose not to focus on the doctrinal differences in the above and instead move on
to presenting our case.
Panpsychism’s strength is that it takes consciousness as fundamental. Neutral monism goes
beyond both matter and mind in search of something more fundamental. Dual-aspect theory con-
siders nature’s interiority sacrosanct. Panpsychism faces the combination problem: how do expe-
riences combine. Neutral monism faces the fundamental problem of a lack of a deeper theory to
ground the neutral “substance.” Dual-aspect theory faces the problem of an a priori split between
interior and exterior which is left unexplained. Finally, emergentist approaches still remain true to
their anti-reductionist origins while facing the complexity problem. The expanded physicalism we
envisage here has much in common with all four. The goal of this work is to suggest an expan-
sion of physicalism [32] which, while accommodating experience, remains plausible. Indeed, we
invoke ignorance of the true physical in embarking on this course. It is here that quantum field
theory (QFT) ontologies are especially useful. Since the ultimate constituents of nature are still a
mystery in QFT, we face the unusual situation of a physical theory which is effective empirically
but whose physicalist underpinnings remain murky. In what follows, we examine QFT ontologies
in search of ways in which experience can be accommodated. Before this however, we need to
first shore up the basic phenomenological intuition informing our physicalist expansion.
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2 Subjects of experience
If the intuition behind the hard problem is unclear to the reader, we suggest the following exper-
iment. Pinch yourself....hard, but not so hard as to hurt yourself (unless you’re a masochist and
are into that sort of thing).
Done? As the (hopefully mild) pain recedes into the horizon, notice the immediacy, interiority
and qualitative feel (qualia) of the pain—which has an onset, a peak and decay. It is also spatio-
temporally localized. When you pinch yourself, other people don’t feel the pain (or don’t appear to).
For these reasons, the first phenomenological intuition guiding our approach is that experience is
always associated with a subject of experience (SoE). This is hugely controversial in analytic phi-
losophy but often taken for granted in Indian philosophy. In the Anglo-American tradition, the harsh
dualism associated with Descartes of (eternal) soul and (temporal) body has largely made talk of
SoEs unpalatable. Recently, however, Strawson [34] has made a yeoman effort in resurrecting the
more limited concept of a “thin subject.” A thin subject is an SoE which is spatially and temporally
bounded, arises and decays and has phenomenal content associated with it during its (typically)
short existence. From an eastern perspective, a thin subject is a (Mahayanist?) middle ground be-
tween the extremes of an eternal subject (often seen in Vedanta) or selfless experiential dharmas
(often seen in Theravada). Rather than try and correlate the thin subject with the mere self (and
other nominal entities) [15], we reiterate Strawson’s point that the thin subject cannot be easily
denied. A thin subject of experience—exactly THAT which is conscious of reading this sentence
right NOW—is a center of awareness, necessarily separate from the phenomenal content which
arises in awareness [6]. Strawson takes this as a given and enshrines it as a thin subject of experi-
ence. The natural concern here is the doubling of mysteries: we don’t understand experience and
adding an SoE to the mix seems to unnecessarily complicate matters. But, following Strawson,
our strategy will be to draw an analogy between the SoE/phenomenal content/experience cluster
and the object/property/process cluster. Insofar as we face serious problems with the concepts of
objects, properties and processes, we can expect to face the same in the consciousness cluster.
The difference is the apparent lack of relationship between SoEs and physicalism. If an SoE can
be seen as a certain type of object in an expanded physicalism, then an experience can be un-
packed as a spatio-temporal property of this new type of object. To prefigure things, we plan to
ground SoEs by suggesting that QFT ontologies can support a new relation in which an SoE can
be seen as akin to a new kind of particle. Since QFT ontologies are still in flux, this does not entail
a commitment to a new substance nor does it imply that the new particles are mere properties.
Subjects of experience do figure in western neo-Aristotelian traditions (as opposed to the an-
alytic tradition). Recently, Lowe [22] and van Inwagen [36] have attempted to take into account
SoEs in a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. van Inwagen, in particular, poses the special composition
question which we present (in modified form) below: can an SoE be seen as a new whole but
composed of existing parts such that the new whole has phenomenal properties associated with
it? The difficulty with this question is that it is not clear what we mean by “existing parts” since
the physicalist base may itself be unknown. The second difficulty is that “the whole is greater than
the sum of the parts” implies a new conception of compositionality or holism which must be ade-
quately defended before this project can get off the ground. Recall that we mentioned earlier the
difference between holistic and taboo physicalism. van Inwagen, in posing the special composition
question, is clearly hoping for a holistic theory (if not a physicalism) which we have reconfigured to
try and address the problem of experience. Such an approach raises compositionality up as a new
principle of wholeness (with emergence being its natural contrast). Or as a slogan, experience is
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a holistic and not an emergent property of the brain. The question for us then is this: can a new
compositionality relation connect SoEs to the physical? And, how is this different from being yet
another emergent property?
To answer this question, we turn to the recent work of Koslicki [16]. More than any other person,
Koslicki, in recent times, has rescued compositionality from becoming irrelevant. Lack of space
does not permit us to do full justice to her work, so we attempt a brief summary. Koslicki has shown
that a new object can be distinguished from its parts provided there are independent reasons for
believing that the new object exists in the first place. For Koslicki, if the new object can be shown
to be a member of a natural kind [20], then a weak supplementation principle can be invoked to
relate the object to a set of material and formal parts. (The presence of formal parts in the new
object clearly marks this approach as a neo-Aristotelian one.) In an exchange, rare in analytic
philosophy, Koslicki engaged in a debate with an opponent who held the view that arbitrary wholes
could be formed by part combination (thereby rendering the concept toothless). The upshot was
that if objects can first be justified on natural kind grounds, then weak supplementation could be
invoked as described above. This raises the question: what is a natural kind as opposed to an
artifactual kind and what do natural kind terms pick out in this world? Unfortunately, this is a very
deep subject with the arguments mostly driven by modal logic. Instead we merely note that natural
kind terms are very prevalent in biology (“a neon tetra is a kind of fish”) and we are seeking here
to apply the same common sense approach to the problem of experience (and therefore ultimately
to psychology). We note the presence of the individual and the collective in the fleshing out of a
natural kind. Finally, it should be clear that biological natural kind objects are clearly composites but
so are motorcycles (Koslicki’s example). Since we are only concerned with natural kind objects,
there will be no need for discussion of the holistic properties (of the lack thereof) of artifactual
objects like motorcycles. The former are our concern and not the latter since we seek to connect
SoEs to natural kind objects.
We have independent reasons for believing that SoEs are natural kind objects in the (physi-
cal) world. Even the most extreme solipsist would probably (inadvertently and occasionally) grant
subjecthood to another person in dialog. And, due to the fundamental role played by second per-
son intersubjectivity in human culture [13], the notion that SoEs form a natural kind should not
be too controversial (provided one buys into the SoE concept in the first place). For at least two
decades, the subdivision of consciousness studies into first, second and third person has been
in place. Consequently, the notion that the second person “experience” acts as a bridge linking
different first person experiences can be taken for granted. Note that we are not attempting to
explain intersubjectivity here. Instead, we again appeal to common sense and note that we are
aware of “the other” via the second person experience. Despite our inability to directly see into the
interior of another person, we accept the existence of the other with experiences similar to ours.
If this is accepted, then we have, per Koslicki, independent grounds for connecting SoEs to the
physical via a new compositionality relation. The work is not yet done since the specifics of the
new relation are where the real payoff will occur. And it may turn out that the new relation is not
explicitly a neo-Aristotelian compositionality relation. All we really require is the grounding of SoEs
as new natural kind objects which have to be related to the physical. We need to carefully expand
physicalism in such a way that SoEs (which are new natural kind objects) can be accommodated
[25]. And since experience is always associated with an SoE, phenomenal content can be concep-
tualized as spatio-temporal properties of the new SoE objects. Regardless of the ultimate status
of the object/property/process cluster, SoE objects have phenomenal properties and are part of
a natural process. While this expansion of physicalism could have been denied had physicalism
been complete, our ignorance of the true physical combined with the murky underpinnings of QFT
allow for an expansion.
5
3 Quantum field theory ontologies and SelfOns
Interpretations of quantum mechanics have been a mainstay in consciousness studies for at least
thirty years [38]. The lack of a single interpretation acceptable to nearly everyone has played a
role in stoking the flames. Quantum mechanics has strange features: (i) a fundamental uncer-
tainty, (ii) wave function collapse, (iii) possibilities rather than trajectories and (iv) entanglement, to
name a few. Quantum mechanisms in the brain [12] have been suggested as playing a role in con-
sciousness despite objections ranging from irrelevance to decoherence [10]. At this juncture, the
orienting generalization for us is the simple fact that quantum mechanics (as opposed to quantum
field theory) is a story regarding particles and how they (occasionally) behave like waves. We are
interested in going in the opposite direction: how and when do waves (or more technically fields)
behave like particles? The reason: in a field theory, particles cannot be seen as basic but instead
as related to their fields. First quantization takes particles for granted and is focused on how they
behave like waves in certain contexts like the two slit experiment or exhibit non-local correlation
as in the EPR experiment. First quantization is still a mystery, undoubtedly due to Schrödinger’s
unusual change of variables approach [27] in a particle Lagrangian variational principle. Second
quantization attempts to obtain particles from field Lagrangians and is the basis of quantum field
theory. It is much less of a mystery with the basic recipe taught in QFT textbooks. In our approach,
we seek to leverage our ignorance of the true physical in order to accommodate SoEs, thereby
explaining experience. The essential new idea: in a nutshell, we would like to expand physicalism
by conceiving of SoEs as akin to new kinds of particles related to a set of basic quantum fields.
The ontology of quantum fields is far from settled [18, 17]. A simple reason is the presence of
multiple QFTs: (i) standard QFT in Hilbert and Fock spaces, (ii) algebraic QFT and (iii) Feynman
path integrals. Consequently, it is difficult to firm up metaphysical commitments. However, regard-
less of the availability of competing QFTs, an orienting generalization we can make is that any QFT
ontology will have to deal with fields, particles and their relations. QFT (other than Einstein’s theory
of gravity) is one of the most empirically successful physical theories. Indeed the standard model of
particle physics [28] (which does not include gravitation) is one of the most rigorously tested QFTs.
The division of matter into fermions (quarks and leptons) and bosons (Higgs, W and Z, photons
and gluons), their relations to fermionic and bosonic fields and their inter-relationships are taught in
standard textbooks. Particle interactions in the presence of three forces (strong, weak and electro-
magnetic) are mediated by corresponding bosons (gluon, W & Z and photon respectively). During
the course of cosmic evolution, the quantum gravity epoch (where gravity and the other forces are
unified) gives way to the grand unification epoch (where the three forces are unified but separate
from gravity). This in turn leads to the inflationary epoch (in which the strong force separates from
the electro-weak) and then the quark epoch (where the three forces in the standard model have
all separated and are distinct from gravity). The sequence of symmetry breakings which cause
a unified field (except for gravity) to separate into three fields and their associated bosons and
fermions is well understood. The particle-field relation plays a fundamental role in all epochs with
forces between fundamental fermions mediated by bosons. Indeed, a standard move in contem-
porary textbooks is to present second quantization as a way in which quantum fields behave like
particles. In this view, all particles arise out coherent field excitations, persist and decay (except
for the photon).
The particle-field relation is central to QFT. Fundamental issues remain as to whether particles
and fields are substances, tropes, properties or something else entirely. There are important no-
go theorems in QFT such as Malament’s [23, 17] which seem to exclude the possibility of spatio-
temporally localized particles at all. These are typically augmented with FAPP (for all practical
purposes) principles in which particles reappear with a FAPP “as if” status despite the underlying
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theory not allowing for their possibility. Some authors have been driven to argue that particles in
QFT are supervenient on quantum fields and their appearance in empirical measurements have
merely a FAPP status. A second concern regarding fundamental particles is indistinguishability
with Wheeler quipping that there was only one electron in the universe. To the best of our knowl-
edge, QFT ontologies have not progressed to the point of posing and answering the question of
the existence of sharp, spatio-temporally localized, distinguishable particles. The intriguing aspect
of QFT ontologies from our perspective is the ability of the universe to manifest particles from field
excitations as opposed to particles being the sole foundation in nature. Whether individual particles
are spatio-temporally localizable or not is secondary; likewise for indistinguishability.
We have now arrived at the point of payoff. We wish to appeal to QFT ontologies in support
of setting up a new relation connecting SoEs to the physical. In this new conception, SoEs are
akin to new particles—SelfOns—that arise out of basic fields, persist and dissipate. Selfons mir-
ror the phenomenology of a thin subject and are associated with phenomenal content (thoughts,
feelings) which are now conceived as new spatio-temporal properties. Selfons can also be seen
as objects of a new natural kind which are always accompanied by experience. Fundamental
issues of indistinguishability, spatio-temporal localization, sharpness and the viability of the ob-
ject/property/process cluster will all have to be worked out within the framework of a QFT ontology:
likewise with the issue of whether selfons are supervenient on a more basic QFT ontology. We
seem to have answered our question in the affirmative: there does not appear to be (at present)
a knockdown argument against conceiving of SoEs as selfons. The ignorance hypothesis (of the
true physical) permits the construction of a plausible new physicalism which includes selfons. As
long as we have independent evidence of SoEs (from phenomenology and intersubjectivity) fol-
lowed by the conception of SoEs as objects of a new natural kind—selfons—there does not appear
to be any barrier to their inclusion into physicalism. Clearly, this is a scientific hypothesis driven
by a philosophical starting point (physicalism) and therefore could be wrong. For example, while
we have asserted that selfons are akin to new particles, perhaps the QFT-selfon relation is totally
different. We feel that it is important to begin with the above selfon hypothesis at this juncture for
the reasons of (i) simplicity and (ii) grounding in present day QFT.
All the standard objections apply: here’s a sample. (i) Basic physics is settled with no place for
selfons; (ii) This is just neutral monism with fields being the neutral entity and ordinary particles and
selfons corresponding to matter and mind respectively; (iii) There are no sharply localized particles,
hence no selfons in principle; (iv) You have gotten confused between particles and states and your
approach actually suggests that consciousness is a new state of matter; (v) This is reductionist to
the core since you have reduced consciousness to (new) particles. There is no space to address
all these (good) objections. Instead, we settle for a brief rejoinder to (i) above. We take it as a given
that basic physics is not settled and that (despite string theory), we are still far away from the grand
unification of gravity with QFT. When we describe selfons as akin to particles, we should clarify
that these new “particles” could better be conceived as composites rather than fundamental. But,
composites how? Note that we alluded to a weak supplementation principle of holism pioneered
by Koslicki. Selfons could arise from a new holistic principle linking basic fields to new particles
(as opposed to being compounds made up of existing fermions and bosons). This is one way
things could go. But this way has already been pointed out by Lowe, van Inwagen, Strawson and
Koslicki. All that remains is for physicalism to follow this lead. While this is certainly a very difficult
task, it is not in principle impossible. This route also bypasses historical divisions between matter
and mind. We reiterate that the conception of SoEs as selfons is suggestive of a new organization
principle linking basic fields to new particles (without being an emergent property of matter). Finally,
this is actually an attempt to do both philosophy and physics with the end result open to multiple
interpretations—due to the unsettled nature of QFT ontologies.
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4 A criticism of and an opportunity for Indian philosophy
We close by pointing out the relevance to Indian philosophy since that setting is presumably more
familiar to the audience than continental or Anglo-American philosophy. A sharp criticism is first
offered which will hopefully be seen as tough love rather than condemnation. This is followed by
a discussion of the new opportunities presented by the hard problem of consciousness in general
and QFT ontologies in particular.
4.1 Criticism
Given the fundamental (and some would say insurmountable) difficulty posed by the hard problem,
one would be led to expect an appropriate response from Indian philosophy especially when the
literature’s obsession with the Atman-Brahman relation for over two and a half millennia is taken
into account. This is not to be found. Dialog with Indian philosophers (and this is clearly anecdotal)
reveals the usual mystical and idealist leanings and a failure to take the hard problem seriously. As
we have previously mentioned, even when we restrict focus to transcendental idealism, there is no
sustained exploration or rapprochement with the idealisms of Berkeley, Fichte, Schopenhauer [4]
etc. When one repeatedly hears the statement that consciousness is fundamental, the world is an
illusion and therefore there is no hard problem, it’s clear that there is no appreciation of the limited,
localized, interior, private and ineffable nature of qualia and the need to relate them to something
beyond. If the reader at this point continues to think that some form of absolute idealism resolves
the hard problem, please note that the split between subjective, spatio-temporally bounded qualia
and the world still needs to be explained even in an idealist metaphysics. And, despite the Indian
literature’s obsession with awareness (as opposed to phenomenal content), we have not seen any
exploration of the triadic relationships between SoEs, phenomenal content and the world. As we
have mentioned above, recently there has been an uptick of interest in treating the universe as a
simulation. Regardless of the physical basis of the simulation, in this picture, there is a clear and
pressing need to relate virtuality and consciousness [14]. We have not seen much exploration in
Indian philosophy of treating the world as virtual (and not merely as an illusion) and attempting to
situate subjective experiences within such a world. Philosophers trained in the analytic tradition
continue to express their frustration with Indian philosophy in private. The criticisms range from: (i)
it is a cul de sac with no interest in other traditions; (ii) it has become dominated by different schools
of Vedanta [8] leaving Nyaya, the Carvaka materialists and the Samkhya dualists [35] behind; (iii)
despite the rise and rise of worldcentric Buddhism in the past forty years, there’s no adequate
response from Indian philosophy; (iv) no attempt has been made to connect the recent interest in
panpsychism with primordial Indian philosophical traditions; (v) too much material remains trapped
in Sanskrit with no interest shown in translation and dissemination; (vi) Indian philosophers (and
to be clear, this criticism is mainly aimed at Indian philosophers disseminating Indian philosophical
views) have a tendency to keep repeating their talking points and remain unable to engage with
a radically different audience; (vii) the (usually tacit) idealist metaphysics hobbles and curtails all
discussion to the jiva-Brahman relation and does not permit exploration of the jiva-world relation.
4.2 Drawing inspiration from Buddhism
We attempt to elaborate on (iii) above in an impressionistic manner. Prior to the ’80s, there was not
much engagement between Buddhism and the west. The explosion of interest in new paradigm
(mainly non-reductionist) thinking and the rise of postmodernism in the ’80s allowed Buddhism
to establish a beachhead in the western academy [24]. Facile analogies between the Buddhist
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(Abhidharma) no-self doctrine and emergentist (and embodied) theories of consciousness [37, 39]
further led to the dissemination of Buddhist ideas. The same was not true of Vedanta and Indian
philosophy in general (but with some exceptions [11]). The comparatively more theistic leanings
of Vedanta coupled with the culture wars in the US and Canada ensured that American Vedanta,
for example, did not have as large a footprint as American Buddhism. Consequently, while Bud-
dhism became the de facto standard bearer (for Eastern philosophy) in consciousness confer-
ences, Vedantic and other Indian philosophical concepts did not have a similar impact. Buddhism
has faced serious problems in its transition from specific Eastern traditions to becoming a world-
centric religion and philosophy. Take, for example, the embodied self arguments in [37]. After
first deconstructing the self in standard Buddhist fashion using Abhidharma concepts, the authors
back away from these arguments by deploying the Madhyamika (shunyata) no-view dialectic on
the Abhidharma. In other words, the sharp and clear no-self, Abhidharma doctrine gives way to
an emptiness of all views, Madhyamika approach. Despite the danger of using emptiness as a
“crowbar” to justify a certain view, the authors return at the end of the book to embodiment of
mind as their position. This allow the authors to (a) introduce Buddhist concepts like shunyata to a
wider and secular audience while (b) promulgating a particular view—embodiment. In the two plus
decades since the book’s publication, Abhidharma and shunyata have entered the consciousness
lexicon but other Buddhist doctrines that build on these approaches have not. It is quite common
to encounter people at consciousness conferences discussing Buddhist no-self doctrines and ar-
guing that the emptiness doctrine should properly be viewed as mysticism but one rarely hears
discussion of Buddhist tantra or Chinese Hua-Yen [3] for example. Admittedly, these are impres-
sionistic and anecdotal observations, but it should be possible to perform data analytics on this
point for confirmation. The take away for Indian philosophy is to follow the example of Buddhism’s
transition from a diverse set of Eastern cultures to a more unified, worldcentric one.
4.3 Opportunity
If the above criticisms and impressions are on the mark, Indian philosophy has a huge opportu-
nity. Despite a rich, vibrant and much better funded philosophical tradition, continental and Anglo-
American philosophy are in crisis. Their continued inability to create a satisfactory quantum field
theory ontology is perhaps not an accident and may be due to a foundational mismatch between
a two and a half millennia western philosophical tradition founded on atomism and modern (and
postmodern) physics. With QFT underpinnings up for grabs, it is astonishing to see continued
talk of the matter-mind split given the swampland foundations of matter. Too much of present
day analytic philosophy still remains obsessed by interpretations of quantum mechanics instead of
delving into QFT and formulating exactly what is meant by a particle. The arrival of the new century
has seen the calls for “Everything must go” [19] at the foundations which are clearly indicative of
something amiss. Indeed, just as Indian philosophy has been mired in mining the Atman-Brahman
relation, the west has been bogged down by the matter-mind split. If as we have suggested, the
matter-mind (or subject-object) split cannot be solved without shaking up the foundations of matter
(via QFT ontologies and the like) and without re-introducing subjects of experience into the mix,
then western philosophy may be ripe for a revolution. It is here that Indian philosophy can play
a worldcentric role by (i) arguing the jiva-world relation using all of the tools at its disposal, (ii)
setting up a three-way relationship between the world, jivas and Brahman and finally (iii) bringing
back the other schools of Indian philosophy [35] who have been neglected due to the univocal
emphasis on Vedantic idealism. (Western scholars do not seem to be aware of the qualified non-
dualism of Vishishtadvaita and the dualism of Dvaita for example and think that Advaita is the only
game in town.) First, selfons offer a bridge between the jiva and the world. The phenomenology
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of a selfon includes awareness of phenomenal content (thoughts, feelings, visualizations, sen-
sations etc.). Since selfons are objects of a natural kind, the hermeneutics (cultural and mutual
co-creation) of selfons include intersubjectivity and proto-language. Next, the structure of a selfon
is based on a new compositionality relation with fundamental fields (and is foundationally different
from that of matter). In contrast to a cartoon Cartesianism, the temporal nature of a selfon is that
of a thin subject which lasts for only a few seconds. As opposed to emergentist theories, selfons
are constituted via a new (holistic) compositionality relation. A potential slide to neutral monism
is avoided by asserting an asymmetry between mind and matter and by preserving a physicalist
foundation. Dual-aspect theory is transcended as selfons can interact with the world (with both
being physical). The approach is explicitly physicalist without being a priori panpsychist. The
triad—selfons, phenomenal content and the physical world—serves as a bridge from physicalism
to different schools of Indian philosophy whereas such a bridge was non-existent between mate-
rialism and Indian idealism. Finally, it is the present day ignorance and uncertainty regarding the
foundations of QFT that allow us to expand physicalism in this manner. There may be unexpected
resonances between QFT ontologies and Indian philosophy that are yet to be fleshed out. Issues
such as indistinguishability and no-go theorems on sharp, localized particles may point to very
intriguing connections between the selfons that form a natural kind and the nonlocal self in Indian
traditions. For example, if there’s no way to have a sharp, spatio-temporally localized, distinguish-
able particle in QFT, then this may apply to selfons as well. In that case, selfons would in principle
be indistinguishable and we can follow Wheeler down the rabbit hole and assert that “there is only
one SelfOn” despite the FAPP insistence on the existence of many. (We do not need to point out
the relevance of the many actually being one to Indian philosophers.) While there’s a tendency
among many Indian scholars to assume that metaphysics is settled (undoubtedly due to the weight
and age of the tradition), the unsettled nature of QFT ontologies should give them pause. Finally,
given the historical impact Indian idealism has had on European philosophy, a revamped Indian
materialism (with aid from the other Indian philosophical traditions) may be well positioned to make
worldcentric contributions to the hard problem of consciousness.
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